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5Introduction:  
The Abolition of Space
The Internet has been with us for scarcely more than thirty years and now it is on the verge 
of disappearing. Originating in the fifties with the first electronic communications be-
tween computers it became a political project during the sixties. The Internet’s technical 
bases were already established in the seventies and deployed during the eighties as part 
of military and scientific research. But it was only in the nineties, when the US authorized 
its commercial use that the Internet evolved into how we know it today. By this point the 
Internet had become firmly grounded on a few elementary principles that ensured its ef-
fectiveness and worldwide success. The Internet had to function on all networks, be able 
to withstand the failure of an important node and be as decentralized as possible. In just 
a few years it evolved into a complex assemblage of fixed and portable computers, cellular 
phones, connected objects, routers, data centers, cables, antennae and satellites – and 
of services and information. Today’s Internet represents the most vast and sophisticated 
communication system ever built.
At present, the growth and scope of the Internet appears limitless. Yet, little more than ten 
years ago, Skype, iTunes, Facebook, Google Maps, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter, WikiLeaks, 
Dropbox, Spotify, Reddit and Instagram did not exist. Earlier developments such as 
Google, Paypal, BitTorrent, Wikipedia, Amazon and eBay, and public access to the Inter-
net are still less than twenty years old. In the Internet’s early days bandwidth, contents 
and services were very limited, and the Internet was only accessible to a minority of people 
whose professional activities enabled them to make use of this new electronic tool. None-
theless, the game-changing nature of the Internet for society had been widely predicted 
in the 1980s. Despite the many obstacles to the global spread of the Internet, numerous 
pioneers were deeply convinced that it would become a powerful medium for free expres-
sion and could revolutionize the sphere of individual freedom.
This ideology largely inherited from cybernetics emerged while the horrors of the Sec-
ond World War together with the spread of communism were attributed to the inefficient 
state of communications in contemporary societies. According to Norbert Wiener, one of 
the major researchers in the Cybernetics movement, societies that had become seriously 
dysfunctional were lacking the effective ‘feedback loops’ required to maintain stability in 
the social system.01 When confronted with dramatic developments such societies did not 
have adequate ‘feedback’ to sufficiently respond to the situation.
Wiener’s conclusion was that any obstruction to the free circulation of information risked 
irreversible destabilization. Therefore the Internet came to be seen as a technical solution 
to the problem at hand since it makes it difficult to censure or control information.
A few elementary building blocks had already been placed in the renewal of one of so-
ciety’s major foundations: the social bond. Indeed, the Internet has effectively trans-
formed the practical terms of interaction. The spatial distance remains, but its nature has 
changed. We are witnessing a radical rearrangement of the relative place of the realities 
01 |  Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press (Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1950.
6that constitute our world. Now, everything that can be dematerialized will be dematerial-
ized, everything that can be connected will be connected. We are now confronted with the 
emergence of a network so technically universal that it is ‘naturally’ inclined to create one 
vast space, progressively covering the planet as a whole.
As the Internet spread globally, so did its tenets. Many aspects of contemporary societies 
were profoundly altered by it as well. Freedom of speech was rarely so effective, offering 
unprecedented opportunities for communication. The ease of organizing small and re-
sponsive collectives spread over vast areas emphasized the Internet’s ability to mobilize 
expertise scattered around particular issues, i.e. online encyclopedias, software develop-
ment, discussion forums, funding drives, political mobilization, etc. The near-zero cost 
of transmission and reproduction of information has disrupted the economy of intan-
gible resources. Free access has become the norm. The circulation of cultural goods has 
reached unparalleled levels.
The Internet is a powerful driver of innovation, fueled by its unique culture of openness. 
This openness is characterized by free access to the sources of its strategic tools and in 
the documentation of those components that are vital to its free usage. The Internet’s 
decentralized structure has resulted in the proliferation of diverse public initiatives and 
associative, private, individual and collective enterprises. Any intermediary wishing to 
impose itself at the expense of more efficient forms of mediation runs the risk of either 
being bypassed or discarded altogether. Twenty years after its commercial development, 
the Internet appears to be at the peak of its potential. Its robustness has been proven as it 
has adapted a much higher growth than its developers had imagined.
But in recent years, the Internet’s founding principles have been challenged in many 
ways, and the diversity and power of these threats are likely to put an end to what now 
increasingly appeared as a utopia. Freedom of expression is now subject to surveillance 
and control on an unprecedented scale. Formerly a space of freedom, the Internet has 
developed into the world’s largest panopticon. The idealistic assumptions of a prosper-
ing collective intelligence have been shaken by the commercial exploitation of individual 
productions and their appropriation through increasingly sophisticated communication 
strategies. The ‘gift economy’ of the Internet is being challenged by the growing demands, 
not all illegitimate, of content producers. As the Internet’s potential no longer needs to be 
demonstrated, very powerful actors are attempting to take control of it, by replacing the 
open and publicly documented standards with closed and proprietary ones.
The decentralization of the network becomes wishful thinking when the majority of com-
munications passes through a limited number of data super-hubs and a small number of 
companies share the majority of online activities. Finally, the robustness of the Internet 
itself faces growing threats: vulnerabilities are increasing and many companies, govern-
ments and individuals have become exposed to cyber attacks aimed at compromising 
confidential and strategic information infrastructures.
In their desire to make the world a common space for all humanity, the early Internet pio-
neers underestimated both the fragility of societies and the strength of opposing forces. 
As societies hold diverse values certain parties are demanding that the Internet increas-
ingly conforms to their own private interests. We now see this confrontation of public and 
7private, individual and collective claims steadily growing and we have to come to terms 
with the fact that the Internet will change profoundly. The Internet was largely built on the 
basis of North American values; today it will have to adjust to a far larger and more complex 
reality.
This is why we now witness both the globalization of politics and the ‘nationalization’ of 
the Internet happening simultaneously. Politics is a subtle art that involves sharing the 
world in a common way. Politics is supposed to organize a peaceful coexistence in order to 
render otherness acceptable. For this to occur politics requires the acceptance of different 
values within society and among societies. Space is precisely one of the dimensions of this 
otherness. In seeking to abolish space, the Internet runs the risk of being abolished by 
space itself, for the simple reason that space cannot be abolished. Individuals do indeed 
belong to multiple spaces, but politics is structured on the basis of territories that are the 
source of its legitimacy. The world as a whole may be an increasingly desirable political 
horizon for humanity, yet the world as such does not yet possess sufficient legitimacy to 
exercise governance over the Internet or to guide its growth and suitability for divergent 
interests. This is the reason why national reactions to the Internet’s universalism may 
well turn ugly unless its political issues and consequences are better understood.
The Internet seeks to reduce the world to a ‘point’. Free flows, abolition of distance, or 
transparency, are just utopias, or dystopias if you prefer, while their actual implementation 
reveals their contradictions. The diversity of the world is at the core of politics. We must 
constantly negotiate a range of political values such as liberty and equality, individuals and 
society, privacy and transparency, free access and property. These values are precariously 
balanced between competing options and their stability is merely temporary. This is why 
the Internet should always be written with a capital ‘I’. In the midst of all this conflict, it is 
absolutely necessary to remember that there is one and only one Internet and that it has 
become so commonplace does not detract from its uniqueness. The Internet is not like 
a radio or furniture. The ‘Internet’ is a proper name, just like ‘Norway’ or ‘The European 
Union’. Whatever we do to alter the Internet, however locally, affects the Internet as a whole. 
Moreover, the end of the Internet would not mean the emergence of ‘micro internets’. Such 
a term would make no sense. There is a more sinister term to describe it: the ‘intranet’. The 
‘intranet’ is a generic term and there are many intranets already. Countries like Iran, for in-
stance, would gladly replace the unique global Internet with national intranets over which 
they have strict control.
This is why it is so important to keep in mind that as our values change so will the Internet 
itself. Neglecting this dual dynamic obstructs clear thinking about the world and the fu-
ture of the Internet. It prevents us from realizing that not only can the relative value of pri-
vacy or ownership change but the Internet itself continues to evolve, constantly readjust-
ing to social, economic and political developments. The Internet is changing society and 
society is changing the Internet. Today it is essential that contemporary societies engage 
in a broad debate about what should be done in this renewed space and to establish the 
rules of coexistence that will make it possible to accommodate the numerous practices 
now emerging. A legitimate policy must arbitrate between the developing possibilities so 
as to make the Internet a legitimate space too. Failing this the Internet will be destroyed 
by conflicting claims. May this book help the Internet survive singular interests and con-
tribute to it remaining a truly global space for humanity.
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From the Abolition of Space  
to the Emergence of Territory
The Internet presents a paradox that is difficult to understand and that has resulted in 
many misconceptions. The Internet is both abolishing space yet at the same time consti-
tuting a space itself. Common language betrays the close semantic proximity of the Inter-
net and space: we speak of ‘going on the Internet’, of a ‘navigator’ (the technical term for a 
browser), we ‘surf’ the Internet, where there are ‘sites’, ‘addresses’, firewalls and paywalls, 
and we talk about ‘virtual spaces’ in general. Immediately from its beginnings the Inter-
net was considered in utopian terms. Coming after the invention of the telegraph and the 
telephone, the Internet meets the growing expectations of being able to make contact 
over increasingly remote distances. The Internet may be explainable purely in terms of 
its technical, economic or social components but first and foremost it remains a spatial 
innovation that attempts to limit the relevance of distance.
THE INTERNET IS A REAL SPACE
It is essential to make a distinction between the societal origins of the Internet’s emer-
gence and the consequences of its deployment on society. Overall, the causes can be at-
tributed to the widespread aspirations to maximize social interaction whereas the conse-
quences are the outcome of the realization of this aspiration. A near perfect analogy for 
this distinction is the automobile: a specific car is produced in response to a recognizable 
demand for individual mobility whereas the long-term consequences of the cars for soci-
ety in general are much more complex.
The cognitive dissonance that arises from this confusion of causality with long-term con-
sequences has created an ideological shift in expectations about the Internet. This confu-
sion is detrimental to a proper understanding of the real relationship between the Inter-
net and its social environment. When the Internet developed, it was not only the abolition 
of space and distances that was suggested but also an implied opposition between ‘real’ 
and ‘virtual’ life and ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ spaces. This opposition triggered many questions 
regarding the Internet’s unique spatiality. When ‘we go on the Internet’, where are we 
actually going? What does a site’s URL and ‘address’ mean in such a context? What is the 
nature of the virtuality of the Internet? Where is the Internet? These questions emphasize 
that in order to understand the Internet, a better understanding of space is essential.
My hypothesis is that the difficulty we encounter in understanding the influence of the 
Internet on today’s world largely stems from an erroneous conception of space. Space is 
usually considered as a material reality and is often equated to the territory on which other 
realities, such as individual people, resources, dwellings and vehicles, are located. This 
weakness in the conception of space, even though it is widely held, can easily be addressed 
by asking a relatively simple question: if space is a thing, where is that thing called space 
located? This question indicates the contradiction inherent to a conception of space as a 
material support for action. It also underlines the confusion surrounding this word ‘space’: 
between what locates and what is located. Space, however, is not material and neither is it a 
support. Certainly, a space can be located but always in relationship to another space.
9The philosophies of Leibniz and Kant in the 17th and 18th century and later natural phys-
ics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, demonstrate that space is an a priori 
condition for understanding how objects are situated in relation to each other. Space is 
not some specific thing, but rather the specific arrangement of things in their respective 
relationships. This shift in conceptualization has markedly transformed both philosophy 
and natural physics already, but we have not experienced its full effects yet.
The consequences of what we could term ‘spatial materialism’ have been substantial. 
This materialist approach to space does not allow us to fully understand what consti-
tutes the Internet’s reality. The opposition between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ life is certainly the 
most absurd outcome of this misunderstanding since it denies the reality of an increas-
ing number of relations, situations and actions. Ultimately this confusion between ‘real’ 
and ‘virtual’ obscures another even more insidious distinction, between the real and the 
material. To be more exact, it is the immateriality of the relations generated through the 
mediation of the Internet that lies at the heart of an enormous misunderstanding. This 
misunderstanding arises from thinking in terms of the traditional materialist conception 
of space. It is not enough to assert that data centers and cable networks form the reality 
of the Internet. The reality of the Internet is far more considerable in scope. It includes 
both the total quantity of data being circulated and all the practices taking place on the 
Internet. These immaterial mediations constitute real and effective interactions which 
feature prominently in contemporary life.
Territory, as a continuous arrangement of relatively stable material realities, whose extent 
can be assessed, is nothing more than a specific space. The advantage of this space is that 
it accommodates our bodies and is an important marker for organizing coexistence. But 
territory does not hold a monopoly on spatial interaction. Mobility-organizing networks 
create discontinuities and rearrange the relative loci of the realities that shape a territory. 
Roads and railways constitute preferential links between places with a kind of material 
stability – e.g. schools, hospitals, housing estates – which demands mobility to be orga-
nized according to what may be mobilized – such as bodies, food, books, materials, etc.
Despite the fact that material realities remain an important component in our daily lives, 
today our societies are becoming increasingly structured by immaterial resources. This 
is especially the case with what has become a major resource: information. The manage-
ment, storage and dissemination of information has become the basis of many of our 
economic activities. To date, we devote a quarter of our lifespan to education, i.e. to the 
transmission of the information we deem to be useful for our development. Our free time 
also is influenced by the dematerialization of music, films and games. Money has increas-
ingly become abstract information and no longer needs to take a material form in order 
to be exchanged.
THE INTERNET AS A PLACE
Today we must learn to understand the mechanisms operating between the material and 
the immaterial, between networks and territories, and between the Internet and the other 
spaces that preceded it. It is worthwhile to stress again that in itself the Internet does not 
abolish space anymore than it abolishes distance. The Internet merely diminishes the 
relevance of distance within certain configurations and in response to specific interac-
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tions. For this to occur, the Internet forms a new type of space, it creates new relationships 
between numerous material actualities, new places that morph into mediations and 
become increasingly crucial to an increasing number of practices. Wikipedia, Facebook 
and YouTube are all among the many specific spaces meeting particular demands with 
remarkable effectiveness. Such spaces are not inferior or ‘virtual’ but very real and actual 
spaces. The immaterial character of the activities taking place within them does not re-
duce their reality. On the contrary, this quality enhances their capacity to fully respond 
to specific needs. These spaces emerge precisely because they meet demands that other 
territorial spaces are not able cater to with the same degree of effectiveness.
It is pointless to stress the virtuality of relationships on Facebook for the same reason as 
it is pointless to compare Wikipedia with the Encyclopædia Britannica. It makes more 
sense to ask what are Facebook and Wikipedia spaces for and to adopt a more balanced 
approach, where territorial spaces are studied through the same questions. Which territo-
rial space allows people all over the globe to collaborate on the production of an encyclo-
pedia that is freely accessible to all? Which territorial space would make sharing at any 
time possible, with contacts we choose, and independent of location? Which territorial 
space would allow us to view or listen to the archive of all audio-visual resources?
Matter is difficult to shift around because of its mass. Displacing matter demands an 
amount of energy exponentially proportional to its mass. But light and electricity, the 
primary carriers of information over the Internet, are composed of energy circulating in 
electromagnetic form. They are waves flowing, ideally at the speed of light. By channel-
ing this energy into continuums we are able to establish these high-speed connections at 
a planetary scale. Thus we are witnessing the emergence of new spaces that restructure 
the relative loci of things. These spaces are not simple transpositions of already existing 
spaces like libraries, shops, kiosks, schools or cafes. They are particular spaces with their 
own specific characteristics. They are spaces that are making a remarkably efficient use of 
the properties of the immaterial. That is the reason why they allow extremely high trans-
mission speeds over long distances.
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF TERRITORIES
The limitations of the Internet are many. Unlike light, the speed of transmission of rel-
evant information within the context of social practices can be slow. This happens for in-
stance when a very high definition film is sent from one side of the world to the other: the 
transfer time can be longer than the film itself. Latency time may also be unsatisfactory. 
The delay, usually expressed in milliseconds, might prove too long for the synchronic-
ity demanded by some videogames or by tele-surgery. The amount of information trans-
mitted within a given timeframe, or bandwidth, and the basic connection time (ping or 
round-trip time) lie at the core of the digital divide. Besides discriminating against people 
and territories according to their access to connectivity, the digital divide is also exempli-
fied in the unequal distribution of connection quality.
The Internet is not an answer to the numerous material challenges we encounter in our 
lives. Our bodies partake in a complex spatiality entailing concrete matter. Sensors mea-
suring and monitoring our activities do of course enhance the interlinking of our bodies 
with an ever-greater number of technical devices. The digital may help us gain a more 
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exact understanding of our practices and their evolution, through feedback that helps 
us make informed decisions and alter our habits. This is something that is captured in 
the term ‘the quantified self’. But the digital is limited to organizing information and 
this does not cover all the demands of our body. Our body requires food to nourish itself, 
clothing for warmth and medicines. Multi-sensorial interaction is also a need, whereas 
the Internet in its current state is confined to the two immaterial senses, sight and hear-
ing, and cannot convey textures, tastes or smells. Our body itself is matter, which greatly 
limits its mobility.
The Internet does not abolish space at all, but recomposes it and augments its potentiali-
ties and therefore as a consequence continually alters the value of ‘situated goods’ – i.e. 
goods whose worth is largely dependent on their locality – and of those resources whose 
materiality represents either a constraint or a resource. Thus, the Internet constantly re-
minds us that territories, the dwelling spaces of our bodies, are plural.
SHARING SPACE, SHARING THE INTERNET
The ideal of digital ubiquity is faced with the challenge of established territories, which re-
main the basic spaces of our existence. These territorial spaces come together with the in-
stitutions organizing coexistence and possessing the legitimacy required to define which 
interactions are appropriate. Now the Internet attempts to impose a common space on 
top of this division of the world into separate territories organized according to different, 
and often contentious, social contracts. Therefore, when the quality of connectivity rises, 
space is not annulled, but on the contrary the disjunction between the Internet and the 
various territorial spaces organizing the world becomes greater in consequence.
In this disjunction, the Internet becomes part of a complex type of spatiality articulating 
places and areas on different scales. Now the formerly accepted tenets of self-regulation 
and free circulation of information characteristic of the Internet are being questioned 
and challenged by societies reclaiming their sovereignty and demanding that the laws 
operating in their territories are obeyed. This disjunction between the plurality of politi-
cal territories and the unicity of the Internet creates in itself a forceful dynamic that favors 
sharing. We are witnessing ever more sharing on the Internet based on common values. 
In concrete terms this means the merging of common ideals within the common space of 
the Internet. But at the same time we can see more sharing on the basis of specific values, 
in other words: a divergence of distinct ideals within distinct spaces.
More generally speaking, we can postulate a confrontation between an emerging ‘world 
society’ aspiring to a globalization of politics and societies grounded in territories 
whose divergent values encourages the fragmentation of the Internet. Long-term typical 
features of the Internet such as freedom of expression, collective intelligence, costless-
ness, openness, decentralization and net neutrality constitute just as many challenges 
and provocations for political organizations that do not identify with these principles. 
Understanding the possible ends of the Internet requires a deeper appreciation of its 
original aims and purpose in the context of their incompatibility with the present day 
political order.
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Chapter 2:  
From the Freedom of Speech  
to the Global Panopticon
In order to understand the difficulties of upholding the Internet’s global consistency and 
coherence, we should start by considering what makes up the core of its development. 
Long before it became the complex and multi-purpose tool of today, the Internet’s primary 
function was to support a more reliable and efficient means of communication between 
research labs. The Internet was meant to withstand major infrastructural disruptions in 
order to safeguard communication in situations of crisis. These underlying objectives go 
a long way towards explaining the convergence of interests between the United States De-
partment of Defense (DoD), which financed the project, and the numerous North Ameri-
can and European researchers who contributed to its ongoing development.
THE INTERNET AS A SPACE OF FREEDOM
During the 1960s communism was still perceived as a threat and many engineers were 
convinced that society should apply the principles of cybernetics. Ideas such as feedback 
and auto-regulation had taken on a particular significance during this era, although the 
premises were already being formulated in the end of the eighteenth century by Henri de 
Saint-Simon. Norbert Wiener further developed these concepts after the Second World 
War.02 At stake was the need to ensure a fluidity of flows within society, not only of goods, 
but also of information. In such a context, obstacles that obstructed the free circulation 
of information created the risk of destabilizing social organizations.
This line of thought converges with the basic tenets of American democracy where free-
dom of expression is a guiding principal. The Internet therefore seemed poised to become 
a powerful engine of democracy and liberty. Since it simplified individual expression and 
frustrated attempts at censorship, the Internet came to be seen as the only mode of com-
munication able to communicate individual information at considerable speed and via 
vast distances at a near zero cost. After the era of the printing press, radio and television, 
the Internet stimulated a far-reaching renewal of the public sphere, giving citizens the 
opportunity to discuss their past, present and future.
In these early days the Internet was considered as a continuation of the Enlightenment 
tradition, since it enabled individuals to form their own opinions and to participate in 
discussions about the best ways to set up the social contract framing their actions. The 
Internet was seen as possessing the potential to enlighten the world by criticizing des-
pots, revealing unjustified privileges, spreading knowledge of political abuse, exposing 
conflicts of interests, and in general watching the people watching us. Politics could rise 
to higher standards as a renewed and more transparent debate took place, ensuring a 
government with interests aligned to the majority of the population rather than catering 
to a small elite that retained power through controlling the circulation of information.
02 |  Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings.
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Though the Internet was primarily conceived as a weapon against communism and 
authoritarian regimes in general, it was just as often seen as the safeguard of freedom 
within western democracies themselves. Distrust towards politics, and more significantly, 
towards the nation-state, was already prevalent as the Internet was emerging. One of the 
most representative texts of this tendency is the famous A Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace written in 1996 by John Perry Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and one of the most vocal defenders of freedom of expression on the Internet. 
The declaration stated:
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded 
by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. We are creating a world 
where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, 
without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity. Your legal concepts of prop-
erty, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all 
based on matter. There is no matter here.03
This excerpt highlights the opposition between the Internet and nation-states. It provides 
an incisive critique of the then existing political order as being inimical to democratic free-
dom. The remainder of the declaration reiterates that states harbor a tendency to threaten 
the liberties on the Internet. This spawned a fierce debate and many people held up the 
Internet’s singularity in opposition to the territorial entities that attempt to regulate coex-
istence.
Yet such an approach to the Internet suggests an equivalent legitimacy between spaces 
of a different nature. In his introduction, John Perry Barlow also mentions the fact that 
the Internet does not possess an elected government, a statement that is emblematic for 
the belief in its self-regulating character. This presupposes a capacity of the Internet to 
confront problems it may face in terms of an internal logic which is indifferent to the 
existence of legitimate institutions permitted to regulate individual behavior.
THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM
A detail John Perry Barlow might underestimate in his particular demand for the indepen-
dence of cyberspace is that there is no such thing as a legitimate social contract on the 
Internet. There are certain rules guiding what is appropriate but these are either dated 
and no longer taken seriously, such as ‘netiquette’, or they have increasingly taken the 
form of bilateral agreements with private, corporate parties, such as Google or Facebook. 
States and governments intervene to protect their citizens’ interest in matters of privacy, 
dignity, property, etc., yet private companies seize every opportunity to one-sidedly decide 
on what is allowed or prohibited.
Despite their effectiveness, the major government organizations of the Internet cannot 
pretend to be representative of all parties concerned. They lagged behind in recognizing 
non-latin script, they did not propose any serious alternatives to the emergence of Google, 
Facebook or Twitter, and have done nothing to confront the mass surveillance of the In-
ternet by the NSA and the intelligence services of many governments. On the other hand, 
03 |  John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 8 February 1996, https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
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John Perry Barlow has probably underestimated the differences between the various 
norms that rule what is acceptable or not. A shared space between the whole of humanity 
is clearly not enough to create a shared set of values.
Social contracts, however, lie at the core of politics. Social contracts are about restraining 
some individual liberties in the name of the collective freedom deemed to be more funda-
mental and these contracts are backed by an authority that is appointed by the community 
for that specific purpose. Politics involve the method of allowing potentially opposing indi-
vidual liberties to coexist. One of the inescapable limits to individual freedom has already 
been formulated in the French ‘Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’ 
of 1789: ‘Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence 
the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the 
other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights.’04 As John Stuart Mill was 
believed to say: ‘the right to swing my arms in any direction ends where your nose begins’. 
The French Universal Declaration, in its legalistic wording, and John Stuart Mill’s assertion 
in a more pragmatic fashion both illustrate a fundamental issue with respect to coexistence.
Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau have aptly 
described the principles that encourage the creation of a social contract between individ-
uals. However opposed their views may be in regard to the reasons motivating the estab-
lishment of rules to govern life in society these three people were remarkable thinkers on 
the emergence of democratic societies. Whereas John Locke wanted society to preserve a 
virtuous natural state, Thomas Hobbes wished on the contrary to protect society against 
a bellicose natural state. But all agreed on the importance of building up an environment 
where the public interest prevailed over private interest. All three thinkers thought that 
since any given individual’s interests were at odds with another’s conflicting interests, 
they could not be protected without a common social contract.
The Internet surely constitutes an opportunity to reconsider modes of coexistence in to-
day’s world as well as the rules guiding collective and individual action because it offers a 
renewed form of the public space, this time at a global scale. But nonetheless, the Inter-
net ‘occurs’ in a complex political environment which to a large extent had already been 
structured before its advent. The basic units of regulation within this environment are 
numerous and sometimes at odds with each other on such fundamental issues as human 
rights, the rights of women, freedom of expression and intellectual property. How could 
the Internet ever decide for the world as a whole ‘what is appropriate’ without imposing 
the values of one particular society? How could it be possible to arrive at a common shared 
space without any regard for the particular social contracts individuals have obeyed? The 
Internet appears as a yet unheard-of space of liberty allowing individuals to remove them-
selves from a society they do not feel at home in. But the Internet also appears as a lawless 
place, where people attempt to impose values and practices on each other.
THE LIMITS OF FREE SPEECH
Freedom of expression is the issue that brings the various political organizations structur-
ing our world into sharp conflict. Certainly, some nation-states such as North Korea and 
04 |  Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 26 August 1789.
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until recently Burma, do not place any value on free speech. Other nations, like the US, 
have made it the cornerstone of their deliberative political system and consider it among 
their most fundamental values. But in exercising these freedoms, numerous restrictions 
always apply when other values such as safeguarding the security of the state or protecting 
property rights are considered to be at stake.
In our present age, no matter which principles are upheld or which rights are enshrined 
in law, no society in the world grants an absolute freedom of expression. Even the US, 
despite the First Amendment to the Constitution stipulating that ‘Congress shall make 
no law (…) abridging the freedom of speech’, largely limits its reach with security-related 
policies and protection of copyright.05 In Europe, besides security and copyright, respect 
for human dignity is also usually considered to take precedence over freedom of expres-
sion. Even though the EU and the United Nations defend freedom of expression world-
wide as a precondition for democracy, they also have set limits to this freedom. In order 
to understand the problems facing the Internet today, we must seriously consider the fact 
that freedom of expression is not fully applied and we must recognize the reasons for this 
restraining of liberty in favor of other rights that are considered more fundamental.
The Internet is often seen as dangerous when the right to freedom of expression is not 
framed within a strict remit. This also explains why, over the past few years, authoritar-
ian regimes have gone out of their way to significantly attack the integrity of the Internet, 
restricting access, filtering contents and putting users under constant surveillance. Re-
porters Without Borders has repeatedly denounced such practices in Bahrain, Vietnam, 
Syria, Iran and China. Moreover the Arab revolutions turned out to be less ideal than com-
mentators originally suggested. It appeared that the Internet had indeed largely contrib-
uted to mass mobilization but also that it had been extensively used to spy on opponents, 
identify them, arrest them and in some cases torture them.
As these revolutions were taking place, such spying practices were denounced and this 
brought the existence of sophisticated telecommunication surveillance technologies to 
light. At this stage a kind of paradigm shift took place, emphasizing the banality of spy-
ing in every society, only later to be confronted with the fact that the technologies these 
regimes were deploying were exclusively developed in Western democracies and more 
specifically in the US, the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Companies like Amesys, Blue 
Coat, Gamma International, Hacking Team or Trevicor were identified as major players 
in this ‘game’ of surveillance. A number of investigative journalists have stressed the risks 
such activities pose, not only for the people living under an authoritarian regime but also 
for citizens residing in the most democratic countries. The latter are now witnessing a 
complete upheaval of the balance between privacy and security, the two essential compo-
nents of individual freedom. Finally it became clear during debates about IP piracy, that 
American and Chinese surveillance technologies were precisely the same, albeit with a 
difference in the official purpose for such surveillance.
The debate on privacy versus security is one entirely about trust and the social contract 
since the latter might justify the sacrifice of a little privacy in order to safeguard liberty. 
05 |  ‘Transcription of the 1789 Joint Resolution of Congress Proposing 12 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution’, National Archives,  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html.
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Yet, when exactly the same technology that is used to protect intellectual property is also 
being deployed to engage in economic espionage and power politics, the real purpose and 
future role of surveillance technologies remains uncertain. In the aftermath of WikiLeaks 
and Edward Snowden’s revelations, we have witnessed a very substantial shift in the per-
ception of how this balance should work out. It is now obvious that neither the Internet, 
nor societies as a whole, will emerge unchanged after these events.
At first WikiLeaks disrupted the control of information on more sensitive issues by high-
lighting the Internet’s ability to distribute massive amounts of data, while at the same 
time exposing the tendency of the media to keep classified information under wraps if 
that appeared necessary. But after the disclosure of documents on the wars in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, WikiLeaks have openly launched an attack on actual surveillance practices, 
exposing the complicity of many Western companies. Remarkably with a few exceptions 
the leaks were not circulated in the mainstream media. It was only after Edward Snowden 
exposed the true extent of electronic surveillance to the public that the media picked up 
the story.
The active role taken by the NSA and the involvement of nearly all the major corporate 
players on the Internet raises some very important questions that lack any obvious an-
swer. Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Microsoft and Apple argue that they had no choice in the 
matter and that they are legally bound to cooperate with the NSA, while being prohibited 
to say anything about the nature of this collaboration. Yet this whole affair jeopardizes 
the social contract Americans are supposed to have with their government. Even more 
importantly, the relationship between the citizens of the world in general and the Internet 
is tainted by such revelations.
Is it possible to reach a point of equilibrium between for example Iran’s stance of setting 
up a national intranet and the NSA’s plan to keep global communication under surveil-
lance? In both cases the Internet is facing an obvious danger as well as a direct attack 
on its integrity. It is therefore urgent to engage in a political debate about the rules that 
should apply to the Internet space. This process has already begun largely through the 
recent disclosures about surveillance. But how can we organize such a debate? How can 
we prevent all parties concerned from retreating into their national borders? How can 
we avoid distrusting the major, international Internet companies when ultimately they 
are far more ‘national’ than they pretend to be? How can we conceive of the protection 
of privacy and security in a space where the rule of law cannot be strictly enforced? Since 
there is no worldwide consensus on which degree of freedom of expression is appropriate, 
instances of censorship are increasing and we are witnessing the eventual end of the In-
ternet. This also applies to cases where the Internet is hijacked for undesirable purposes. 
Today, the confusion around freedom of expression is embodied in the names of Chelsea 
Manning, Julian Assange and Edward Snowden. For some they are heroes of democracy 
and for others they are national traitors. Chelsea Manning, an American citizen, has been 
condemned to 35 years in jail by her own government, while Julian Assange and Edward 
Snowden have take refuge in the limbo of international law.
One of the ‘end of the Internet’ scenarios takes place in the midst of the fight for freedom 
of expression and the developing capacity for surveillance and censorship. This end-game 
scenario pits businesses, governments and citizens against each other among growing 
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opportunities both to convey information and to keep a close watch over the exchange of 
information. The distinction to be made between the US and China is not their techno-
logical means, which are essentially the same, but rather the ends motivating their sur-
veillance practices. Vinton Cerf, one of the Internet’s founders, reminded us recently that 
Internet freedom is facing the same threat as publishing and broadcasting did in their 
time.06 The end of the Internet, as far as the freedom of expression is concerned, may be 
considered as one of the many motives of nation-states, in order to conform the Internet 
to their own values.
We have to face the relatively simple dilemma, either the Internet follows existing nation-
al social contracts or it becomes in danger of being even further partitioned in the near 
future. Today only states are able to legislate within their borders against the leaking of 
military secrets, child-pornography, libel or so-called ‘involuntary porn’. This is especially 
the case with the US where the government issues direct orders to providers in order to 
take down sites that do not comply with what they deem to be fundamental standards.
Contrary to John Perry Barlow’s aspirations, the Internet in itself does not possess the 
capacity to address and regulate illegitimate practices and conflicts of interest – just as 
the international political system is unable to self-regulate. Rather the opposite is the 
case: civil peace and the respect of human dignity is something that has been developed 
in most modern democracies through a complex process of regulation for the common 
good. It is precisely because freedom of expression is such an essential part of this regula-
tion that it is itself being regulated. As valuable as freedom of expression may be, it does 
not in itself subsume all the necessary conditions of coexistence.
In order to transcend this contradiction it is necessary to move beyond the legitimate 
framework of nation-states, which are increasingly in denial about their own internal 
discrepancies and which obstruct their citizens’ bond with humankind at large. Nation-
states are also unable to cope with the fact that their operating scale is no longer appro-
priate for the vexingly complex problems of the world today. Yet the globalization of the 
Internet does not in itself bring about the globalization of values, let alone that of politics. 
The Internet does facilitate the emergence of a political space at the scale of the planet but 
that space still has to be invented. By the time this has actually happened there is a real 
chance that the Internet will cease to exist.
06 |  Vinton Cerf, ‘Father of the Internet: Why We Must Fight for its Freedom’, CNN, 30 November 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/29/ 
business/opinion-cerf-google-internet-freedom/.
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Chapter 3:  
From Collective Intelligence  
to Distributed Capability
The reason why freedom of expression takes on such importance as an issue is because 
it lies at the very core of the collective organization of coexistence. Free speech is what 
enables us to question the existing order and is one of the pragmatic conditions for the 
exercise of democracy. It not only allows us to cast doubt on the prevalent ideas at a given 
time but also to challenge the actors involved in governance and the enforcement of 
rules and laws. Individual freedom of expression allows for an informed debate among 
citizens; without this basis it is impossible to arrive at our own critical opinion. But this 
consideration was overlooked for a long time and was restated only towards the end of the 
seventeenth century. The acknowledgement of the individual as a basic unit of collective 
intelligence appeared at that moment as the necessary condition for the emergence of 
a common, non-transcendental body of thought leading to the establishment of mod-
ern democracies. The difficulties encountered in assessing the potential of individually 
organized groups is probably due to the common confusion between the frailty of indi-
vidual intelligence and the power of collective intelligence. To believe in the potential of 
individuals as a collective means exactly the opposite of believing in the potential of a 
sole individual; i.e. it means acknowledging individual fallibility while at the same time 
recognizing the power of insight residing in each one of us.
DEMOCRACY AS COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION
Democracy is certainly one of the most powerful manifestations of the potential dis-
cussed above. Democracy literally constitutes a political choice for the organization of 
particular interests in the service of a common good. It encapsulates Abraham Lincoln’s 
famous dictum that democracy is ‘the government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people’. Such a statement presupposes first and foremost that individuals are those 
best placed to know what is good for them. It has by now become obvious that societ-
ies that choose to organize their government along these lines have witnessed economic 
growth far in excess of those that pursued a different route. These societies have in partic-
ular fostered the emergence of the individual human being as the basic unit of the social 
contract and endowed her with a new degree of acceptance, freedom and protection. The 
intrinsic superiority of democracy over an oligarchic system, let alone a dictatorship, was 
nonetheless far from obvious in the beginning. It required the development of a complex 
architecture of representation and delegation. This is because democracies need an effec-
tive freedom of speech to function, but must also safeguard the autonomy of what is its 
ultimate affirmation: the ballot box.
Misgivings about the democratic order of societies are bound to remain, but they mostly 
convey the difficulties of coordinating what is common with what is individual. Many have 
pointed out the shortcomings of democracies but many also share Winston Churchill’s 
view that ‘democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time’. The philosopher Karl Popper noted in his opposi-
tion to the many enemies of democracy that even though democracies might choose to 
19
elect future tyrants they are still preferable to already established tyrannies.07 Democra-
cies may well hold the instruments of their own destruction but they also possess those 
of their preservation.
THE PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
Democracy as a large-scale experience of collective intelligence perfectly illustrates the 
difficulties encountered in fostering the emergence of meaning from the gathering of 
single persons. The limits of this process may be summed up according to the following 
elementary principles:
1.  The degree of participation should be large enough in order to correctly represent the 
population concerned.
2. Individual intentions should be voiced independently from each other.
3.  The tallying up of individual intentions should be done in a fully transparent manner in 
order to ensure clarity in the translation of individual preference into collective decisions.
The difficulties encountered in conforming to all these conditions explain why the emer-
gence of democracies remains tricky and awkward. It also explains how the Internet came 
to be seen as a powerful medium to foster collective intelligence. From Pierre Levy’s 
Collective Intelligence to Pisani and Piotet’s The Alchemy of Multitude and Surowiecki’s 
The Wisdom of Crowds, there have been numerous writings which portrayed the Inter-
net’s capacity to reformat the practical modalities of coordination and coproduction of 
knowledge and understanding.08 Collective intelligence, in order to emerge, presupposes 
an effective synchorization09 of individual intelligences, meaning the process by which 
we produce together the space we need in order to be and to act or interact. The Internet 
appeared to be offering a new opportunity to produce space at the global scale and to give 
intelligences worldwide a chance to converge into a common space. But now, after two 
decades of existence, it would seem that this potential to achieve confluence is reaching 
the same limits as the democratic process regularly encounters.
THE LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION
As of today, almost one third of the world’s population is connected to the Internet. His-
torically, the Internet is probably the mode of communication that developed the fastest, 
reaching out to virtually all corners of the world in just a few decades. But this remark-
able diffusion went together with just as many remarkable disparities. For example, a full 
eighty percent of Americans are connected, whereas ninety-eight percent of Nigerians 
07 |  Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, London: Routledge, 1945.
08 |  See: Pierre Levy, Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace, trans. Robert Bononno, New York: Perseus Books, 1999; 
Francis Pisani and Dominique Piotet, L’alchimie des Multitudes, Paris: Pearson, 2008; and James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, New 
York: Doubleday, 2004.
09 |  Synchorization, derived analogously to ‘synchronization’, is the process where we create together a common space of life, just as synchroniza-
tion creates shared time. See: Boris Beaude, Internet, changer l’espace, changer la société: les logiques contemporaines de synchorisation, 
Limoges: FYP Éditions, 2012.
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and Somalis are not, as stated in the ‘Internet World Stats’ of June 2012.10 Moreover, con-
sidered alone the word ‘connection’ incorporates but also distorts substantial qualitative 
inequalities. This starts with the connectivity’s technical performance itself, but is even 
more apparent in the socio-economic conditions pertaining to the usage that is made of it.
Connection to the Internet is one form of participation but actually contributing to its 
content is an entirely different task. Wikipedia, one of the most representative examples of 
collective intelligence presents a massive disparity between users who merely consult it and 
users who contribute to its content. In September 2013, a miniscule 0,0002% of users of the 
French language version of Wikipedia were active contributors, i.e. users having edited at 
least five entries during the past month.11 The number of users having edited fr.wikipedia.
org three times a day is only 713 per 20 million visitors. This is still a far greater number 
than the amount of editors of the French encyclopedia Universalis.fr and may explain the 
relatively high quality of Wikipedia articles. Nonetheless it represents only a tiny minority 
of the general population. This phenomenon can be observed with the majority of the Inter-
net’s content production mechanisms, whether blogs, users’ valuation/assessment sites, or 
comments on news articles.
Not that participation on these platforms is modest; on the contrary, it is considerable. 
But it is still relatively limited when compared to the sum total of Internet users. When 
considered relative to the whole world population, it is absolutely marginal. Recognizing 
this does not detract from the fact that there is a high quality content collectively pro-
duced on the Internet but some caution is necessary when assessing this state of affairs.
INDEPENDENCE
Delegating production without a priori is surely the main characteristic of crowdsourc-
ing. Providing the opportunity for everyone to contribute to the common good according 
to her availability and interests improves interactions and enables more open forms of 
innovation. Developed platforms like Wikipedia do not screen contributors but opt for a 
model of a posteriori evaluation and strictly limit this to what has actually been achieved 
within the framework of the encyclopedia.
This practice has been inspired by the way open source software was developed and how 
it disrupted the previously held assumptions about expertise. The Apache server used by 
the majority of Internet sites, the PHP scripting language and also the Linux operating 
system were developed along lines of ‘delegation’ that are quite similar to those applied 
by Wikipedia. These approaches show the potential of decentralized production formats 
which now compete with increasing success against more hierarchical models.
Yet the success of the concept of collective intelligence turns into a disadvantage when 
significant interests come into play. Its inadequate representation, despite the large 
number of participants involved, leads to burgeoning conflicts of interests between those 
who profit individually from valuable modifications and those who take care of the over-
10 |  See: Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
11 |  For recent English and French Wikipedia statistics see respectively https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/TablesWikipediaEN.htm and  
https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/TablesWikipediaFR.htm.
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all quality of the contributions. This phenomenon, already commonplace in IT develop-
ment, is even more pronounced in the case of Wikipedia. It has now become clear that 
the current troubles with Wikipedia are not about amateurism but are caused by creeping 
professionalization, where some users have both a personal interest and the expertise to 
contribute to the encyclopedia’s content. This is particularly the case with businesses and 
celebrities who are increasingly attempting to manipulate Wikipedia’s content in their 
favor and they do not hesitate to hire specialized firms in order to carry this out.12
Collective intelligence is now compromised by the growing power of individual intel-
ligences that knowingly intervene in the distribution, valorization, coordination and 
promotion of specific content.13 In addition to the case of Wikipedia discussed above, it 
would appear that an increasing number of specialized firms try to manipulate the open 
delegation process in their favor. For example, TripAdvisor and the many other equiva-
lent sites encouraging user advice, comments or feedback are subjected to continuous 
attempts of manipulation and product placement, spin or bashing competitors.
For a long time this phenomenon was largely marginal and also often considered vaguely 
absurd but it has gradually become entrenched over the past few years. Specialized agencies 
now resort to increasingly sophisticated methods where they mask their intervention within 
in a far larger set of contributions with the sole purpose of generating fake credibility for their 
client.
The French competition, consumers and trade practices watchdog (DGCCRF) has repeat-
edly condemned such behavior while the standardization body AFNOR has put forward 
normative guidelines on how online public notices should be formatted. The Internet 
has now reached a dead-end of sorts as privacy can no longer be strictly regulated and 
anonymity increasingly appears to be both a source of liberty and of manipulation. This 
contradiction is handled by democracies by identifying individuals when they come to 
the polling station but in such a way that no link can be made with their vote. This basic 
principle is essential to coproduction processes as it vouches for the integrity of collec-
tive creation while verifying the legitimacy of the individual contribution. The limits to 
anonymity are becoming more evident by the day, whereas the Internet’s potential to 
allow for individual expression is usurped for the benefit of those who have the greatest 
mastery.
AGGREGATION
Collective intelligence increasingly depends on the use of algorithms that exploit the 
digital traces of a number of individual actions in order to make sense of them. Google’s 
search engine is surely the most remarkable example.14 The outcome of this development 
is a web hierarchy that is considerably more productive than previous classification at-
tempts but which also comes at the cost of a growing functional opacity and unprecedent-
12 |  For example the firm Wiki-PR: http://www.wiki-pr.com/.
13 |  Distribution, valorization, coordination and promotion are the four characteristics of collective intelligence postulated by Pierre Levy.
14 |  Google exploits all hypertext links but also the users’ reaction on search results in addition to a number of other indicators that the company 
does not disclose for evident strategic reasons.
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ed breaches of privacy. Now that Google is the search engine of choice for the majority of 
people, we should surely examine the consequences of this unprecedented capacity to 
process individual and collective information.15 The regulation of such an opaque infor-
mation classification and hierarchization process presents an obvious problem.
By now the potential of collective intelligence has reached such a high level that digital 
data traces form a strategic issue of vital importance. The vast majority of the most visited 
websites in the world are dependent upon the exploitation of personal data. Google and 
Facebook, to name the most well known, finance themselves almost exclusively through 
customized ads by exploiting private data.16 The current standoff between the European 
Union and Google about the cross-referencing of data and the duration of data retention is 
symptomatic of the problems encountered in regulating privacy in a digital environment 
where considerable profits are at stake. Between developing a ‘soft consensus’, averaging 
out differences and extreme customization with the concomitant risk of seeing privacy 
destroyed, stands the opacity of algorithms whose role is increasingly decisive.
SHARED MEANING AS A POLITICAL ISSUE
‘Collective intelligence’ is an attractive turn of phrase but is nonetheless deeply problematic, 
starting with the very terms ‘intelligence’ and ‘collective’. The limited degree of representa-
tion of its authors should make us cautious. Nor is the emergence of collective intelligence 
a given. The aggregation of individual practices may make this happen but to achieve this 
requires a large amount of manipulation, which takes place in a completely opaque and 
obscurantist manner.17 This is how we witness the slow mutation of ‘collective intelligence’ 
into ‘distributed capability’, which has no other outcome than to increase the power of 
those who already possess it. This may result in an increase in the general power of under-
standing but it may be wise not to harbor too many illusions about what kind of intelligence 
and collective this implies.
The current controversies about privacy, non-transparency of algorithms, the rights and 
compensations relating to work produced collectively and the identification of their respec-
tive authors have morphed into as many political issues. The Internet is not by itself able to 
handle such contradictions and neither are states able to impose their divergent values and 
interests on a space that is shared. The fact that states are unable to enforce compliance 
with principles they deem fundamental or critical has become a major source of contention 
and by now presents a considerable risk to the very integrity of the Internet. Some online ser-
vices demand a strict proof of identity from their users, whereas others allow total anonym-
ity. Some companies cross-reference enormous amounts of private data, retained for years 
on end, and find this perfectly legitimate, whereas others deliberately desist from engaging 
in such practices.
15 |  Baidu and Yandex, China and Russia’s favorite search engines respectively, may be the exception here but their methods are the same as Google.
16 |  In 2013 Google’s revenue was in excess of US $50 billion, mainly due to advertising income. See: ‘Google’s Income Statement Information’, 
Investor Relations, http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html.
17 |  For example see Google’s flu epidemics prediction engine based on trends in users searches on the illness (which was later critiqued as 
not being accurate at all). See: Jeremy Ginsberg and Matt Mohebbi, Google Official Blog, 11 November 2008, https://googleblog.blogspot.
co.il/2008/11/tracking-flu-trends.html.
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The issue is not just about the exercise of individual freedoms. What are such freedoms 
worth when firms enjoying a monopoly position are able to impose rules of their own choos-
ing, invalidating democratic laws whose diversity is intended to manage a shared world? 
If, as Lawrence Lessig emphasized ten years ago, ‘code is law’, then it becomes urgent to 
understand that citizens no longer collectively decide on certain laws that rule their life-
world. What will become of the Internet when firms are able to implement national legisla-
tion in their own way, while individuals have no such power? These problems once more 
underscore how important it is that the world emerges as one common political space for 
humanity. But it also underlines the Internet’s precarious position in a world that is not yet 
one society.
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Chapter 4:  
From Free to Proprietary
Both freedom of expression and collective intelligence have much to do with the Inter-
net’s characteristic spatiality. By simplifying the global transmission of information, the 
Internet is part of a deep reconfiguration of society. This change also alters the economy. 
The practical arrangements of transactions are no longer the same. The mass practices 
typical of today’s Internet are due to the radical transformation of space it brings about 
which have substantially increased the potential for contact and interaction over remote 
distances, while at the same time considerably reducing their costs. Such dynamics dis-
rupt existing economic models, which are being challenged every time the choice is made 
to conduct a transaction over the Internet.
The Internet’s development also went together with the spread of the principle of ‘free’. 
Access to many goods and services that previously carried a substantial price tag effec-
tively became gratis. By altering space, we found ourselves in a different economy. The In-
ternet has now become a highly desirable space where increasingly powerful actors vie for 
more visibility, centrality and profits. But the transition from a propriety-based economy 
to one based on access is not essential, especially when creators’ rights are trampled and 
privacy is sacrificed for the sake of dubious benefits.
THE SPATIAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS
Since every economic transaction is also a form of communication, it is not surprising 
that the economy is influenced by the expansion of the Internet. In order to take place, a 
transaction is shaped by two distinct spatial features: visibility and exchange. The Inter-
net has a significant influence on these two elements of a transaction.
Visibility is a vital component of the economy since its absence would make a transaction 
impossible. It represents the initial condition for demand and supply to come together. 
Advertisement, recommendations and visual merchandising all contribute to visibility. 
The actual exchange constitutes the other component of a transaction. Once a level of vis-
ibility has been attained, finalizing the transaction demands a contact between demand 
and supply. Such contact is obvious in the case of a physical display in a shop, but less so 
when the demand appears on ads or from a friend’s recommendation. The object of the 
future transaction needs to be communicated between the party desiring it and the one 
able to provide it.
From classified ads to auctions, from flat swapping to accessing music, project funding 
to stock trading, the Internet has changed the economy in its most fundamental aspect: 
the practical modalities of exchange. This is especially the case where non-material re-
sources are at stake, but it actually impacts on all things that may become an object of an 
economic transaction: e.g. the hospitality trade, financial institutions, publishing houses, 
etc. By enhancing visibility and simplifying transactions, the Internet has significant con-
sequences for the economy as a whole. In this sense Amazon might well be the most strik-
ing example of the complex coupling of the material and the immaterial in the service of 
economic transactions.
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THE LOGIC OF FREE
The generalization of ‘free’ remains puzzling. Visibility and contact may have been greatly 
simplified but does this justify that most exchanges are free of charge despite the fact that 
many of these shared resources involve a monetary value? Does music, film or journalism 
simply lose monetary value when they become accessible on the Internet?
In order to understand how the notion of a gift economy could spread so fast and to assess 
its limits, it is necessary to review a few fundamentals about the gift economy itself. Free 
is something that actually does occur in economic transactions; in this case it serves as 
a means and not an end. It represents an option where revenue is generated at a later 
point and involves diverse practical modalities. These range from advertised discounts 
to gifts and merchandise.18 That free handouts, despite their efficacy, are not even more 
commonplace comes from the fact that they still represent a non-negligible risk to the 
merchant: i.e. not being able to recoup the cost of making the resource available for free. 
Therefore, the higher the price of the resource involved, the greater the risk. However the 
Internet has considerably reduced the risk of loss by lowering the costs of visibility, con-
tact and production. ‘Free’ therefore can include many more trade practices, shrewdly 
profiting on its symbolic appeal. This is because a price tag, however small, immediately 
puts a clear restraint on the chance of an exchange occurring.
FROM ECONOMIES OF SCALE TO NETWORK EFFECTS
The ubiquity of ‘free’ on the Internet is the outcome of many factors nurturing the emer-
gence of a gift economy. Considering the cost of communication and reproduction is es-
sential in order to understand the parallel rise of a firm the size of Google, the legitimate 
circulation of journalistic articles free of charge and the illegal pirating of music and film 
on a vast scale. The concept that all these ‘free’ resources, legitimate or not, share in com-
mon is economy of scale pushed to its limits. This is already an overriding principle in the 
sphere of material production. The higher the quantity of goods produced, the less their 
unitary costs, as the marginal cost of every unit produced after the first one dwindles. In 
the case of production and editing of music or film, economies of scale are very substan-
tial but conversely so are the costs of their materialization as books, CDs and DVDs in 
terms of production, storage and distribution.
The convergence between digital production and the development of the Internet has 
now resulted in near zero marginal cost of production. Once it has already been produced 
the cost of an additional digital copy of an article, song or film is almost nothing. This 
tendency to introduce such large economies of scale has reshaped the economy of ‘free’ 
by radically cutting down the distribution cost of creative works.
WE ARE THE PRODUCT
Our service economy is also transformed when encountering such opportunities. The 
advertising industry is the most demonstrative in this respect, as advertisements can now 
be very precisely targeted. With data mining techniques it is now possible to identify previ-
ously vague targets much more accurately and develop specially customized ads. Google’s 
18 |  Razor giant Gillette is widely acknowledged as the pioneer of this approach, introducing the first disposable blades in 1903.
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immense market cap value, one of the highest in the world, is based on a free service and 
provides a perfect example of the new digital economy. This is only possible because while 
the service may be free for users, it is certainly not for advertisers. In 2009, the journalist 
Mike Elgan devised a knowing expression for this phenomenon by suggesting that when a 
firm creates a remarkable product and then makes its free to use, the actual product is not 
the one everybody believes it to be.19 What Google ultimately sells to us are our practices, 
our own gaze. What Google also sells, is advertisement space along with the audience who 
will be exposed to it. The real product is the user and the true customers are the advertisers. 
Google and Facebook have every reason to offer their services for free to the highest possible 
number of users, in order to increase the visibility of ad-space it sells to companies.
Economies of scale also create a virtuous circle for these firms as their appeal and market 
value grow in tandem. With more users Google is able to sell its ad-space at a higher price, 
while at the same time improving the quality of its services. By exploiting personal data, 
Google not only increases its value for advertisers but it can also improve the ranking of 
Internet sites, improve the information on Google maps, provide better suggestions on 
YouTube, enhance the anti-spam package on Gmail and in general improve the perfor-
mance of all its related services.
Facebook’s model is even more straightforward: it simply utilizes what is called ‘the net-
work effect’, that is the increase in value derived from the increase in the number of us-
ers. An Internet site whose returns are dependent on its running costs being offset by ad 
revenues has every interest in making the network effect work for it as soon as possible. If 
it is successful, new competitors are at a notable disadvantage because the revenue from 
current users increases while the marginal costs of the service dwindles to zero.
In concrete terms, Google has generated 50 billion US$ in revenue for the financial year in 
2012 while incurring only 37 billion US$ in expenses. This amounts to a cost of 37 US$ per 
user. In this context ‘free’ can only be understood as a means and not as an end. It is the 
ultimate ends of these exchanges that really need to be understood.
FREE AND RIVAL GOODS
The principle of ‘free’ on the Internet is supported by a large number of people who be-
lieve it represents the ultimate expression of freedom together with a massive opportunity 
for economic growth. The support for gratis, therefore, goes further than considerations 
about reduced transaction and production costs. Gratis disrupts the previously prevailing 
obstacles to the dissemination of non-rival goods. The economic notion of rivalry lies at 
the core of the debate about gratis, now that the modus operandi of digital resources is no 
longer aligned with conventional interpretations of rivalry.
Unlike material resources, intangible resources may be used by several parties simulta-
neously without conflict arising.20 Material goods, on the other hand, are ‘situated’, and 
19 |  Mike Elgan, ‘Google’s Business Model: YOU Are the Product’, Datamation, 5 February 2009, http://www.datamation.com/columns/ 
executive_tech/article.php/3801006/Googles-Business-Model-YOU-Are-the-Product.htm.
20 |  There are rare exceptions, for example when a site happens to have a high amount of traffic at one given time and a server overload results in 
a form of rivalry. But this example underlines the fact that rivalry is not so much about the resource being transmitted as about the capacity 
of the vector of transmission.
27
therefore cannot be the object of multiple transactions. ‘Displacing’ means precisely the 
end of ‘placement’ at a specific space in favor of placement in another space. But trans-
mission does not involve displacement. Intangible goods, once transmitted, still remain 
available to the original transmitter and other parties. This difference lies at the heart of 
the disruption of the traditional notion of ownership, as it was developed at a time where 
intangible goods were limited purely to ideas.
Numerous proposals have been put forward to address the particular characteristics of 
intellectual works whose usage is non-rivalrous. One of the more prominent representa-
tives of this debate is Richard M. Stallman, a noted computer scientist and advocate of 
Free Software. As founder of the eponymous foundation, he is also the foremost promoter 
of the notion of copyleft, originally put forward by the artist and computer engineer Don 
Hopkins. Copyleft constitutes the most radical alternative to copyright licenses. It autho-
rizes unlimited use, modification and diffusion of a work, provided the same conditions 
apply to any subsequent derivative work.
The antagonistic radicalism of copyleft versus copyright as the only available options in-
spired legal expert Lawrence Lessig, another prominent advocate in the cause of ‘free’, to 
develop a legal framework that is more adapted to the categorical diversity of exchanges. 
He became the originator of the Creative Commons licenses, which offer a modular legal 
tool box, which can be made to conform to national legislations and is much more flex-
ible than the traditional intellectual property systems.
Creative Commons licenses protect the authorship of works, while at the same time 
making their usage, circulation and modification much more straightforward. Creative 
Commons licenses assigned copyleft and copyright to opposite ends of the spectrum of 
intellectual property rights and allowed the creators to specify permission for quoting, 
commercial use and adapting or modifying their works depending on their wishes.
In 2008, former Wired editor-in-chief Chris Anderson emphasized the link between gratis 
and freedom. He predicted the generalization of ‘free’ to an increasing number of sectors in 
the economy. Anderson was much less liberal in applying the principle to the book he pub-
lished the following year on the subject. He allowed himself to ‘borrow’ numerous excerpts 
from Wikipedia without any reference.21 When his book became an editorial block-buster, 
he simply shut down the free downloading option. This debacle is indicative of the prevail-
ing confusion between freedom of use and gratis. Gratis facilitates a much more liberal 
freedom of use but on the other hand, it can easily amount to misappropriation or simple 
theft. It appears as if Chris Anderson had a bad experience with both sides of that same coin.
Intellectual property rights are facing a major crisis and more works are disseminated 
without any consideration for their original creators. So what is the value of a resource 
whose marginal cost is infinitesimal? What is the right price for a news article, a song or 
a film, when its transmission carries a near-zero cost? How should the sharing of what is 
not our own be defined? Who really owns the data produced by the users of social media 
and crowd-sourcing platforms? Do patents on software actually foster innovation? Finally, 
what does the ownership of a non-rival resource actually imply?
21 |  Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of Radical Price, New York: Hyperion, 2009. Also see: Waldo Jaquith, ‘Chris Anderson’s Free Contains what 
Is Apparently Plagiarized Text’, Waldo Jaquith Blog, 23 June 2009, https://waldo.jaquith.org/blog/2009/06/chris-anderson-free/.
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WHAT IS THE PRICE OF ‘FREE’?
The ambiguous nature of gratis is due to the way it can be both a vector of freedom and 
one of dispossession. When talking about ‘free’ it is always important that we ask who is 
paying and for what. The prevalence of gratis on the Internet covers many different re-
alities and the only thing they have in common is the Internet’s potential to reduce the 
per-unit cost of transmission and reproduction to a negligible amount. But even when a 
resource is non-rivalrous and its marginal production cost zero, the initial cost of produc-
tion still remains an unresolved issue. Furthermore, everything digital requires an array of 
hardware infrastructures that may involve substantial running costs.
Wikipedia, the paragon of gratis and openness, is no exception. The Wikimedia Foun-
dation relies entirely on donations and could not sustain the notable Wikipedia project 
without them, despite the fact that all content is user-generated by volunteers. The Foun-
dation has firmly rejected any financing through adverts, citing independence, transpar-
ency and user privacy as motives. This ethical stance necessitates increasing levels of 
fundraising while the success of the encyclopedia repeatedly raises its operating costs.
Despite the fact that it gets the benefit of almost 30 million people contributing for free and 
several thousand volunteer workers, the Wikimedia Foundation still maintains a staff of 
200, mostly on engineering, programming, legal work and fundraising for projects. Server 
hosting charges also involve substantial costs. For the financial year of 2012 Wikimedia’s 
expenses were almost 50 million US$. This was paid with funding through several founda-
tions such as Stanton and Alfred P. Sloan, major IT corporations – Apple, Google, Micro-
soft – and an increasing volume of user donations. This particular form of gratis remains 
an exception on the Internet. Although its approach shares much in common with the ones 
practiced by many Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) initiatives, Wikipedia’s immense 
popularity demands far more financial resources. FOSS and Wikipedia nevertheless remain 
exceptional examples of the potential of gratis, provided funding can be secured.
The Mozilla Foundation, the ‘mother’ of the Firefox web browser, is a good example of the 
weaknesses of this type of funding. Originally funded by AOL after Microsoft anti-trust 
convictions, the Foundation presently derives most of its funding from Google, which 
wanted its search engine to be the default on Firefox. But Google, tired of paying Microsoft 
for Internet Explorer, Apple for Safari, or the Mozilla Foundation for Firefox, launched 
its own browser, Chrome. Now Mozilla not only directly competes with all the major IT 
corporations but also with its primary funder. Firefox’s market share is already dwindling 
and it will be increasingly difficult for it to continue competing with transparency, open 
access to the source code and respect for the privacy of user data. The deep pockets of 
Google and Microsoft in the battle for dominance over one of the key components of 
digital practices means that Mozilla, despite its remarkable initiatives and the quality of 
Firefox, will probably become the next big casualty in the brave new world of free.
The psychologist and economist Dan Ariely makes the same point when he argues that 
we are paying far too much every time we get something for free.22 This was also the point 
of Milton Friedman’s adage ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’. Therefore in order to 
22 |  Dan Ariely, Kristina Shampanier and Nina Mazar, ‘Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products’, Marketing Science, (November, 
2007): 742-757.
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understand the price of gratis, it is necessary to always keep the product in mind. What 
Facebook, Google, YouTube, Wikipedia and Twitter all have in common is that they all are 
mediation platforms where content is produced not by the companies themselves but by 
their users.
The preference for crowdsourcing by Google, Wikipedia, Twitter and Facebook does not 
embody all possible production formats. In fact, the confusion between mediation and 
production is such that many sites actually consist of illegally obtained content. In some 
cases the transmission, while nearly costs-free, comes with a fee, whereas the production 
costs are not covered at all. The least important consideration in these transactions is the 
actual value of the property changing hands. This should not detract from the fact that 
gratis is still a crucial factor for spreading the idea of free use. It also encourages a spatial 
fluidity whose value is still not fully understood. Unfortunately this fluidity translates into 
a concentration of power in the hands of a small number of firms that are now becoming 
mere intermediaries. As intermediaries these firms derive all of their profit from content 
they do not produce themselves. This is the reason why gratis threatens those creations, 
which cannot always be accommodated in this mediation-based business model.
This is particularly true in the case of investigative journalism and the creation of audio-
visual content. Investigative journalism is a long-term project requiring a high level of 
expertise and sometimes involves gaining specific rights. Producing a film requires an 
investment that can cost millions of Euros. Recording a music album also demands a lot 
of time. A society that does not appreciate the costs of production runs the risk of creating 
a crisis in the creative industries where only those who are financially independent or able 
to derive adequate revenues from ads are successful. This is a possible option of course 
but one that will impoverish the diversity and the quality of creative work for the ben-
efit of intermediaries who are not particularly concerned with the actual content. Since 
those who want to produce without expecting remuneration are already free to do so, why 
should we impose this model on all creative workers?
The Internet makes a simplification and remodeling of the traditional modes of funding 
possible. But these new modes demand a design that is adapted to interaction and that 
has a fair balance between liberty and property. Lawrence Lessig has shown how changes 
in the general circumstances of society can help those who had a good grasp of the former 
circumstances to protect themselves and fight back against novelty, like in the case of the 
railways in the 19th century and the radio in the 20th century.23 Nowadays we might say 
that the ruling powers will change the Internet rather than be changed by the Internet.
It is not useful to see something illegitimate in this attitude. The digital economy is still 
in its developmental stage and its evolution should respect the wishes of those who pro-
duce necessary resources. The future digital economy should also acknowledge all the 
resources that have already been produced and favor access above property, adjust to ever 
more demanding practices, accept globalization and encourage micropayments.24
23 |  Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, New York:  
Penguin Press, 2004.
24 |  Piracy also gets a boost from the lag between cinema release and video-on-demand access.
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William J. Mitchell, long time architecture professor at the MIT, has already foreseen 
these developments in 1995 and has proposed a system where access would be charged 
but not the goods or services.25 He also recommends revising the system of property rights 
while at the same time advancing respect for intellectual ownership. These proposals 
have lost none of their appeal but the film and music industry majors declined to adopt 
any of them. They still value ownership over access, adhere to a rigid copyright law and are 
generally despised by their own customers. Yet the success of Netflix and Spotify shows 
the efficiency of an offer that is far better matched to the present digital practices. Piracy 
has declined sharply, encouraging the development of platforms based on access instead 
of ownership and offering a greater selection of content.26 Still both Netflix and Spotify 
are subjected to constant pressure by the film and music industries which view them as 
competitors and not as mere distributors.
In the end, the many political initiatives intended to enforce compliance with property 
rights more than anything else demonstrate a fundamental lack of respect for the actual 
producers of the shared music and films. Recognizing that some producers are happy 
with the free dissemination of their work does not make this stance mandatory for all 
intangible goods and their producers. At this stage the political stakes are high and many-
faceted. States must now respect privacy, protect authorship, facilitate the funding of 
tomorrow’s production, ensure correct taxation while at the same time not obstruct the 
potential of gratis.
But this will lead to online behavior being subjected to an even higher level of surveillance. 
It will be deployed to finance free services and to supervise the crackdown on piracy. The 
new surveillance devices that have been developed over the last few years are indicative of 
this new trend. Since values regarding liberty, privacy and ownership are unequally shared, 
we will witness a further partitioning of the Internet. The current national restrictions on 
the distribution of Netflix and iTunes are only the first symptoms of this new future.
The main political issue of today in this regard is to uphold the potential of gratis while at 
the same time safeguarding authorship and intellectual property rights. Such a challenge 
almost certainly entails more interventions in the basic components of the Internet. The 
Internet Society (ISOC) is very aware of these issues in its role as policies, technicalities 
and development watchdog with a particular concern for the Internet’s enduring open-
ness and transparency. But at the same time, the most powerful nations of the world, no-
tably the US but also the UK and France, are actively pursuing a recovery of their national 
sovereignty and the Internet will not remain unaffected.
25 |  William J. Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, Place and the Infobahn, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995.
26 |  In Norway, piracy dropped from a high of 75% in 2008-2012, with 50% of Norwegians now having a Netflix and/or Spotify account and 25% 
using a paid account.
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Chapter 5:  
From Decentralization  
to Hypercentrality
Scarcely twenty years after its commercial development and expansion, the Internet’s as-
piration to be a forerunner of diversity, plurality and liberty has been severely curtailed. Its 
potential for decentralization and disintermediation is now pitted against new tenden-
cies towards centralization. An apt term for this phenomenon is hypercentrality. Hyper-
centrality results in the near-infinite concentration of online activity among a very limited 
number of spaces. Google, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, Wikipedia, Yahoo and Skype, all 
possess an unprecedented degree of centrality and have hundreds of millions of users 
worldwide.
Gratis, or offering services to users for free, is the business model these platforms have 
in common and it is the most effective way to achieve such a degree of centrality. Once 
a sufficient level of network effect has been reached selling ad-space becomes easy and 
a range of business approaches can be tested, such as the sale of merchandise and ad-
ditional services. The potential for value extraction in such economic spaces may then 
become enormous.
With more than one billion users Facebook undeniably exerts a considerable influence on 
today’s society. It is therefore crucial to understand the rationale of such concentration 
before analyzing its political consequences. This is perhaps even more necessary when 
firms like Facebook run their business transnationally. Facebook shrewdly works around 
various legal and financial frameworks to their advantage and avoids the potentially less 
favorable national, economic and political influences.
THE TENETS OF DECENTRALIZATION
The functional centrality we now witness in the Internet is completely at odds with the 
original features of the project as it was envisaged in the 1970s. At that time the Internet 
was considered to be the most decentralized communication device possible. The TCP/IP 
protocols and the majority of protocols for email and file transfers were devised in order 
to be shared by all Internet service providers (ISP) and site hosting services, without any 
need to maintain any particular centrality. Even the extremely strategic Domain Name 
System (DNS) permanently redistributes information, despite being based on a limited 
number of key servers.27 The original World Wide Web protocol, HTTP (Hyper Text Trans-
fer Protocol) is also completely open and decentralized, allowing for the creation of web-
sites on any computer as long as it is connected to the Internet.
Previous file sharing sites like Napster, which ran on a central server to connect users to 
each other or MegaUpload, which hosted files directly, have been replaced by more de-
centralized platforms. These sites benefit more from the Internet’s potential, for example 
BitTorrent not only allows for the sharing of files among users but also of the resources, 
computers and connections.
27 |  The best known of such services are OpenDNS and Google. They offer an alternative to other local access providers.
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Yet the development of social networks, the spread of blogs, and the popularity of BitTor-
rent have created new centralities. Personal homepages are being replaced by blogs on 
platforms such as Wordpress and Tumblr. Facebook and Twitter are replacing forums 
and email. This is how potential decentralization reconfigures into functional centraliza-
tion; largely for the benefit of those actors who are able to take advantage of these new 
forms of centralities. Occupying a central place is a major asset, since such a key position 
can only be challenged by severe disruptions of existing technologies and practices.
THE POWER OF DEFAULT CHOICE AND STATUS QUO
One of the simplest methods to achieve centrality was used in the beginning of the 1990s 
by many access providers. This was at the dawn of commerce on the Internet and AOL, 
Wanadoo and many other companies used their homepage to promote their own services, 
often against the best interest of their customers. Yahoo, for instance, built its centrality 
on its homepage far before the rise of Google. Microsoft acted more insidiously, by bun-
dling its own ‘Internet Explorer’ with the Windows operating system, at the expense of the 
Netscape web-navigator, its superior competitor at the time. Even Google has resorted to 
such methods, despite its effectiveness, by offering large sums of money to become the 
default search engine on Firefox and Safari.
Manipulating customers’ choice by activating a service ‘by default’ is common practice 
and it has been vigorously condemned by behavioral economists, such as Richard Thaler 
and Case Sunstein in their work on ‘choice architecture’.28 Thaler and Sunstein dem-
onstrated that the options that were offered by default were almost always chosen over 
alternative ones when this involved some additional action. This was even the case when 
crucial decisions had to be made, for example the choice of a pension plan.
The issue of default choice is the more pressing because of its connection with another 
empirical observation: once made, a choice is rarely altered. This has been further dem-
onstrated by many legal measures against the deceptive use of the default option, the 
most famous example being the European Union’s ruling on the bundling of Explorer 
with Windows. There is a real need to crack down on default options, especially when 
made by quasi-monopolies and when such default choices are usually long term.
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser had already described this phenomenon, 
known as ‘status quo bias’, in 1988, before it was repeatedly demonstrated by further re-
search.29 It is nevertheless becoming an increasingly common practice by many IT firms 
which tend to reinforce the bias by creating a captive user environment. Personalized 
experience and the imposition of proprietary formats with little or no compatibility with 
other platforms make switching online environments even more difficult. This partition-
ing by service providers contributes to increased centralization against the customers’ 
interests, as is the case with iOS or Android for mobile phones, Windows and Mac OS for 
operating systems, Firefox or Chrome for navigators, etc.
28 |  Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2008.
29 |  William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, (1988): 7-59.
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CENTRALITY AND NETWORK EFFECTS
The most powerful element to achieving centrality comes from the network effect. 
Through default choice, status quo and gratis, the number of users expand and often to 
a high enough level to substantially enhance usage value. This is why the common criti-
cism that we cannot have more than a 120 meaningful friendships on Facebook confuses 
several distinct issues and ultimately prevents us from understanding what is really at 
stake. On the one hand Facebook is a social media platform that supports a large number 
of relationships of a diverse nature, not all of which are close or everyday. Facebook is a 
good example of so-called ‘weak links’. Its features make it possible to maintain relation-
ships at a distance but which would be wearisome to keep active through other mediums 
such as telephone, mail or face-to-face. On the other hand a critique of social media based 
on the work by the British anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar, 
suggests that the highest number of relationships a human being can maintain is some-
where around 150. This theory is based on a comparative analysis of the relative size of the 
neocortex and is corroborated by the remarkably consistent average group size of 148.4 
individuals in modern hunter-gather societies.30
To infer an analogy between this hypothesis and the optimal number of Facebook friends 
however is dubious. If this were the case how can we explain Facebook’s success and the 
growth of modern cities? In both cases, the appeal of the urban environment or of the 
most frequented social media space is based on the opportunities they offer the individu-
al to find what they desire even if not all possible opportunities will ever be realized. What 
is important is the potentiality of relationships, the fact that they may occur. This is why 
the network effect is so crucial to any service operating on the Internet. It is a space with 
a near-unlimited potential for centrality; an idea some corporate actors have understood 
all too well.
FROM THE MULTIPLICITY OF TERRITORIAL PLACES  
TO THE SINGULARITY OF NETWORKED PLACES
Understanding the rationale of hypercentrality demands a good grasp of the particular 
properties of networked spaces. The concentration of more and more digital practices 
in a growing number of spaces cannot simply be translated into a notion of territorial 
places. Territorial places are based on contiguity whereas networked places are based on 
connexity.
The multiplicity of territorial places is unavoidable because matter takes up space and its 
relocation takes time. This is why we have seen a proliferation of similar places, respond-
ing to a number of very basic spatial needs, like the need to stay dry, to pass on knowledge, 
to seek medical care, etc. Therefore, a flat, a primary school or a local shop cannot be 
‘globalized’, not only because they have a limited capacity but also because the distance in 
relation to other spaces would become too great. The reason why territorial places can be 
in excess of what is required despite their distinctiveness is because territorial distance 
still remains relevant in many circumstances. It becomes crucial when the body is a key 
element in the interaction. Economies of scale are not an exclusive preserve of the Inter-
net and hence monopolies may also emerge in the case of territory-based activities but 
30 |  R.A. Hill and R.I.M. Dunbar, ‘Social Network Size in Humans’, Human Nature, (March, 2003): 53-72.
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the process will take much more time. Such monopolies will face local constraints that 
are more difficult to handle and territorial domination is also more complex and costly.
The Internet is composed of networked places whose spatiality is based on the movement 
of intangible items. The near instant connectivity of the Internet gives it an edge which 
when optimized may have distinct consequences. That any given place on the Internet 
may be reached by a single mouse-click does not result in a plurality of spaces, but on 
the contrary, it gives a strong advantage to the most efficient spaces. This is exactly what 
hypercentrality is about. It represents a centrality endowed with so much power that it has 
the potential to force itself upon space in general, absorbing the periphery into one single 
point of total, boundless intensity.
This rule applies to all domains: most notably Wikipedia and Facebook but also to instant 
messaging services like WhatsApp and Viber, to crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter, 
to flat-share sites such as Airbnb and Couchsurfing.com, to dating sites like Match.com 
and Tinder, and finally to evaluation sites such as Yelp, TripAdvisor or IMDB. All these 
sites are spaces whose effectiveness grows with the number of their users. The higher per-
forming sites only further increase their centrality by benefiting from a positive feedback 
loop that is extremely detrimental to other competing sites lagging behind in network 
effect, visibility and centrality accretion.
THE RATIONALE OF RETICULAR COALESCENCE
What makes hypercentrality such a noteworthy factor is that it intensifies the features of 
centrality to an extreme degree. Once hypercentrality has been achieved in one domain, 
the visibility gained makes it much easier to buy out the remaining local sites. InterAc-
tiveCorp, the owners of the Match.com dating site and the ads site eBay, did exactly that in 
order to enhance their centrality in cultural spaces where other sites had already attained 
a considerable centrality. Hypercentrality then makes it possible to start new services by 
benefiting from a phenomenon best described as reticular coalescence. This is why we 
witness a growing diversity in the more central spaces that aim to broaden their activities 
to other services in order to achieve the same degree of centrality with this new service.
Thus hypercentrality has a tendency to reduce the number of spaces devoted to a par-
ticular issue and the dynamics of reticular coalescence make these few remaining spaces 
vie with each other for total centrality. Yet, network effects are sometimes so powerful 
that even the holders of longstanding, sweeping centralities still cannot overcome them. 
This is the case with Facebook, whose hypercentrality appears to be entirely immune to 
attacks by its competitors. Facebook’s domination becomes exasperating when we hear 
its founder Mark Zuckerberg claim that his expansionist policies are justified due to fact 
that the service he provides is analogous to a public electricity supplier. But electricity is a 
physical good and its production and distribution involves a large range of private compa-
nies. We would never want to depend on a single monopolistic corporation to provide all 
our electricity at a global scale.
Google was not able to develop its own large-scale social network despite its remarkable 
degree of hypercentrality. The usual strategy of buying up spaces with an established 
strong centrality is more of a struggle as such spaces are already overvalued in most cases. 
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Yet more corporate actors are tempted to take advantage of their prominent position in 
order to buy out potential competitors or to offer additional services. This allows them 
to take full advantage of economies of scale, network effects and hypercentrality, and 
ultimately to extend their domination. Recent examples are when Facebook bought out 
Instagram and WhatsApp whose growing success was perceived as a threat.
Today, Internet space is divided up between a small number of big companies that in-
creasingly compete against each other and considerably reduce the potential for differ-
ence. Google has managed to extend its activities to nearly all the services available on 
the Internet: from email, videoconferencing and web browsers to DNS servers, mobile 
phones and translation. Google’s expansion into operating systems and web browsers 
must be seen as an active strategy of total Internet domination. If we understand the In-
ternet as a space, it is easy to also understand why Google offers both an operating system 
and a web browser for free. Both systems are core components of Google’s ‘mastering 
Internet space’ strategy. All online activities are dependent on these two software pack-
ages, giving Google a massive lead on today’s Internet life. Google’s position not only al-
lows it to constantly improve its services but also to continually valorize them, making 
its hypercentrality potentially limitless. Never before the advent of the Internet did one 
single company possess such a pervasive influence over the daily activities and private life 
of so many people.
This is why hypercentrality is one of the more understated ends of the Internet. It ex-
plains the growing tendency of a handful of vast corporations to distort the basic tenets 
of the Internet in their favor, creating increasingly closed and extensively interconnect-
ed proprietary environments. This approach completely overturns the openness that for 
years had been the Internet’s most distinctive feature. Facebook and Twitter lead the 
trend in forcing their users into ever more impenetrable protocols and appropriating 
user content.
The current problems associated with hypercentrality are just the early symptoms of a far 
worse crisis to come, since these vast corporations aim for total global dominance and 
possess a growing number of resources. Facebook increasingly sets the norm for what 
is acceptable or not, both in terms of user privacy and freedom of expression in general. 
The moment that Facebook has the power to decide that showing a beheaded women is 
less shocking than nudity, some serious questions arise. Once Google can independently 
decide on the appropriate data retention period and go against the position held by many 
governments including the EU, the legitimacy of its decisions becomes highly question-
able. Finally, how can the world remain indifferent when these companies continuously 
pass on private information on all their users to US government agencies?
Major political problems arise when for profit enterprises acquire such a degree of hy-
percentrality that they can evade the legislation and taxation systems of most democratic 
nation-states. These developments call for a new, global political order that is able to pro-
vide a countervailing force against this concentration of private, corporate power. If we do 
not manage to face up to this task these firms will be able to force their own values and 
interests upon the world at large and those are not the same as their users’. The alterna-
tive is implementing the rights and policies pertaining to each territorial space and will 
result in a fragmentation of these services, ending their globality.
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Hypercentrality foregrounds particularly complex ‘ends’ of the Internet, where openness 
and decentralization of services clash with its segmentation into separate arrangements 
conforming to the range of regulations actually in force. There is a growing belief that such 
services should be the elementary building blocks of the Internet and that they should be 
based on open and transparent standards, as all previous Internet standards were, e.g. 
email and the World Wide Web. Otherwise a radical partitioning will be unavoidable as 
hypercentrality leads up to a breaking point.
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Chapter 6:  
From Resilience to Vulnerability
Ultimately we are witnessing the end of the Internet’s resilience as its nodes become ever 
more vulnerable. The Internet was developed with a particular focus on the decentralization 
of its most strategic resources and on the dynamic management of its connections accord-
ing to the conditions of the supporting infrastructure in each area. Despite a few localized 
glitches, this proved to be a very successful approach and the Internet has demonstrated its 
ability to withstand attacks on several of its integral parts.
However, we can now see the emergence of two specific vulnerabilities which both require 
complex resolutions. Firstly, attacks on strategic resources are increasingly destructive, not 
only compromising data and infrastructure but also endangering individuals. Secondly, it 
appears that network intrusion expertise is very unevenly distributed, revealing the exis-
tence of ever more blatant, imperialist strategies.
NETWORK STRENGTH AND NODE VULNERABILITY
The success of the Internet makes its resources increasingly attractive for exploitation. As 
more of our activities take place online where they leave digital traces and depend upon ser-
vices, access to this data becomes an ever more high-stakes game. A non-exhaustive list would 
include: cyber attacks into the Élysée Palace’s communication system and the French finance 
ministry, the US Defense department’s plan for advanced strategic weapons, Patriot missiles, 
theft of the design data for the F18 jetfighter and prototype F35 plane, the Stuxnet malware tar-
geting Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, electric grids compromised by IT attacks, 30,000 desktops at 
a major oil corporation hacked to the point of disabling its operations; malware that uses the 
camera on a personal computer for spying, Adobe discovering that a number of its apps’ code 
had been stolen, hackers breaking into the servers of The New York Times, The Washington Post 
and The Wall Street Journal in order to identify individual journalists, Gmail compromised by 
authoritarian regimes who hunt for political dissent, and finally the realization, even before 
Snowden, that all our communications are under surveillance and recorded.
Considering these well-documented examples we may conclude that our world has changed 
a lot, with privacy no longer protected and security even less so. The ubiquity of the Inter-
net has enhanced our capacity to communicate, coordinate and coproduce but at the same 
time this blanket connectivity exposes us to new vulnerabilities. Individuals, businesses 
and governments are now carefully exploiting these vulnerabilities to an extent that we can 
only guess at.
Remarkably, once their novelty has disappeared, these vulnerabilities tend to be seen as un-
exceptional. But this means that we might not have understood where their real significance 
lies. The situation now is still so new and removed from what we once understood as spying 
that we don’t really have a proper frame of reference to interpret it. But we should not fool our-
selves about the extent to which we are exposed to these vulnerabilities. Today no government, 
company or individual can be entirely sure if they have complete control over the information 
in their possession. Banning mobile phones and tablets during confidential meetings where 
the stakes are high is a good illustration of this state of affairs. Spies must now either resort 
to more conventional and onerous techniques or develop more sophisticated cyber methods.
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RETICULAR IMPERIALISM
This situation is disturbing because hackers are far from the only groups to exploit these 
vulnerabilities. On the contrary, many hackers strive to identify and report them, in order 
to highlight the system’s vulnerabilities. Over the past several years, the ongoing involve-
ment of nation-states in cyber attacks has become undeniable. Unsurprisingly China, 
Russia and Iran are accused of espionage by the US, which has even prohibited the use 
of certain Chinese hardware. But the US appears to be the most powerful actor in this 
surveillance game with hardware manipulation, malware development and techniques to 
destabilize networks, all easy feats due to their hegemonic position in the global Internet 
hierarchy.
The US has achieved an unprecedented level of control over information by exploiting 
their privileged access to Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Cisco, Microsoft, Apple and all 
other critical network infrastructures. Edward Snowden’s disclosures are only the tip 
of the iceberg. Since the end of World War II and later augmented in partnership with 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the US has been continuously 
developing a vast surveillance infrastructure. ECHELON and PRISM merely represent 
the ‘visible’ part of the growing infrastructure of surveillance designed for strategic 
purposes.31
Political complications are likely to rise when it turns out that surveillance measures 
overstep their strictly military purpose and are used for economic, industrial and politi-
cal espionage. In the early 2000s, ECHELON was denounced for its idiosyncratic spying 
on Kofi Annan but also on corporate entities like Airbus, Thompson and Toyota.32 Today, 
this time on the grounds of fighting corruption and terrorism, the US’ determination to 
uphold its ‘national security interests’ appears stronger than ever.
The full-scale development of surveillance techniques took place in successive steps, 
each stage demanding a further step in the interconnectivity of networks. Since 9/11 the 
legal framework regulating the power of surveillance in terms of scope, retrieval and data 
use has been greatly enhanced with the US taking the lead. Article 215 of the Patriot Act 
is typical in this respect as it authorizes the seizure of any ‘tangible’ personal material, 
even without the need for the individuals concerned to be suspected of terrorism. This 
article was further amended to permit digital data collection without warrant. In 2008, 
article 708 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) made this act applicable for 
all form of foreign intelligence gathering.33
31 |  ECHELON is part of a worldwide telecommunication surveillance system set up by the US in collaboration with the four other aforemen-
tioned countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand referred to together as ‘The Five Eyes’) from the early 1960s. This 
system was heavily criticized in the 1990s when critics suspected that its main purpose was for industrial espionage. For an overview of the 
postwar development of US ‘strategic’ electronic surveillance see: John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, ‘Surveillance Capitalism: 
Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age’, Monthly Review, Vol. 66, Issue 3, 2014, http://monthlyre-
view.org/2014/07/01/surveillance-capitalism/.
32 |  In March 2000, James Woolsey, CIA’s former director, told the press that spying on allies was justified by their tendency to engage in corrupt 
practices to the detriment of more honest American firms. See: James R. Woolsey, ‘Why We Spy on Our Allies’, Wall Street Journal, 17 March 
2000, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB95326824311657269.
33 |  See: Elizabeth B. Bazan. ‘The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues’, Congressional Research Service,  
7 July 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf.
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These expanded surveillance laws have landed the US in a situation where they find 
themselves at odds with their most fundamental values, in particular with the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches or seizures and 
requires any warrant to be judicially sanctioned by probable cause.34 Drafted at the close 
of the 18th century, the US Constitution might no longer be fully suited to our contem-
porary world, yet it still constitutes the core of the American legal system. It is therefore 
not surprising that it is being invoked to question the constitutional legitimacy of NSA’s 
ongoing surveillance operations.
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE NET  
AND THE PRECARITY OF INDIVIDUALS
The vulnerability of the Net now also means the vulnerability of the individual. Debates 
about striking a balance between security and privacy have become largely distorted, 
since privacy is itself an element of security. Privacy is a fundamental value within demo-
cratic societies because it underwrites the free exercise of individual activities which have 
their ultimate expression in the vote. This is the reason why totalitarian regimes actively 
suppress privacy. Though every social contract implies some relinquishment of privacy 
for the sake of the common good, the terms of such a contract must be thoroughly negoti-
ated. In our present circumstances, it absolutely needs to be renegotiated in view of the 
evolution of the means and methods of surveillance.
The urgency of a broad, public debate on the issue of surveillance becomes obvious when 
senior political personnel in the US, the country that maintains the most extensive intel-
ligence apparatus, need to read The Guardian in order to learn about the range of their 
own problems. Or when the world hears the President of the United States tell the Ameri-
can people that they need not worry, because they are not under surveillance, only the 
rest of the world is. What should ‘the rest of the world’ make of such a message? This is 
an even more pressing issue since the Internet has rendered the distinction between US 
and non-US citizens extremely problematic. Google, Facebook, Twitter and many other 
platforms do not make any distinction according to the nationality of their users, since 
the networked nature of their services demands an overarching aggregation of all users.
The space that surrounds us is also no longer the same as we continuously expose our 
daily life and geographic location online. The numerous loopholes, whether purposely 
designed or simple glitches, are all the more worrying in that they are not properly under-
stood. They expose us to any group or individual savvy enough to understand the weak-
nesses of the system. Less than one century of history should be a good enough reason to 
worry about the danger such possibilities represent.
A consequence of these vulnerabilities becoming more apparent is the growing tendency 
of online activities to be reorganized at the national level, while at the same time politics 
also takes a more nationalist turn as the global economy declines. Russia and China are 
34 |  ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ See: ‘Transcription of the 1789 Joint Resolution of Congress Proposing 12 Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution’, National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html.
40
developing operating systems of their own; the US no longer wants to see its strategic 
institutions utilizing Chinese hardware and many European countries want to abolish 
cloud computing if hosting is facilitated by US-based firms.
To affirm Eric Schmidt’s slogan: ‘If you have something that you don’t want anyone to 
know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place’ means assenting to the conver-
gence between Facebook, WikiLeaks, Google and the NSA.35 All these actors claim unfet-
tered access to user information makes the world a better place. Which raises the ques-
tion: which world are we talking about?




From Net Neutrality to  
the Neutralization of the Internet
The Internet was supposed to abolish distances, advance freedom of expression, en-
hance collective intelligence, foster the potential for gratis, decentralize power and resist 
any attempt at taking control of the Internet itself. Regrettably, we must come to the con-
clusion that these ideals are rapidly fading away. Seemingly abolished barriers are being 
re-erected again. Freedom of speech is subject to a number of restrictions. Engagements 
and capabilities are still unequally distributed. Power has never been so centralized. We 
are clearly witnessing the end of the Internet as we formerly knew it. By altering the na-
ture of space, the Internet has changed humanity’s social configuration; but humanity is 
so diverse that it will not allow the Internet to remain unaltered.
New boundaries tend to emerge everywhere. By now, the United States, the United King-
dom and France, among other countries, are forcing search engines to suppress URLs 
and ISPs that lead to spaces which are in breach of their respective legislations.36 The out-
come is different search results to conform to cultural norms and local regulations. The 
content available on iTunes, Netflix, YouTube or Spotify varies from one country to the 
next and in some cases is not available at all. To avoid violations of the Internet’s integrity 
an increasing number of individuals use techniques similar to those of the Chinese and 
Iranian Intranet users in order to gain access to Facebook or Twitter.
Freedom of expression has come increasingly under threat. Anonymity is becoming 
impossible in many countries and immense machineries of surveillance allow authori-
tarian regimes to identify and eliminate opponents. Mass media is also coming under 
increasing pressure, despite the fact that access to confidential documents is far easier. 
WikiLeaks is a great example of the precarious nature of confidentiality on the Internet 
and the coercive environment we find ourselves in when trying to question it. Journal-
ists working for The Washington Post and The Guardian have already expressed concerns 
about being urged not to publish too extensively on certain issues, notably surveillance. 
Companies like Lavabit, an email service offering advanced security to its subscribers, in-
cluding Snowden, had to close down when they were issued an order by US Government 
agencies to allow access to their data.
Meanwhile the potential of ‘collective intelligence’ remains skewed towards particular pur-
poses. While a small number of communities contribute to the common good, such as the 
Wikipedia community, this minority must take an increasing number of actions to prevent 
attempts at manipulation and disinformation. Moreover, online activity increasingly takes 
place within privatized environments. Facebook and Twitter in particular constitute vast 
information resources that tend to be the preserve of the true customers, i.e. advertising 
companies. The ongoing privatization of socially produced content runs against the idea of 
open standards that were used to full satisfaction for years, until now. Such openness could 
have been beneficial to the development of social networks and instant messaging if only 
their aim had been to unambiguously support the real interest of their users.
36 |  See Google’s ‘Transparency Report’, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/.
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‘Collective intelligence’ is increasingly exploited by a few privileged intermediaries who 
are allowed to freely handle and aggregate data produced by everyone else. The immense 
potential of this information of course does not directly benefit those who produce it 
when those producers are controlled by a restrictive environment where the owners of 
the platform determine the degree of confidentiality. Under close analysis it becomes 
blatantly obvious that advertisers are the real customers of these services and the users 
are merely the products.
The infringements on both freedom of expression and collective intelligence more gen-
erally illustrate a new concentration of powers, to an extent never seen in recent history. 
Facebook and Google, with their exhaustively detailed knowledge of actual online be-
havior, possess an unmatched power over contemporary society. The United States and 
to a smaller extent, China, France and the United Kingdom, have obtained a wealth of 
information on communications, relationships, reading habits and geographical posi-
tions of millions of citizens including heads of states and CEOs.
Through taking advantage of the standardization of communication devices, even 
amateur hackers can engage in spying, e.g. by using the webcams of naive users without 
them ever noticing. These rearrangements in the power of surveillance and manipula-
tion take place with a total lack of transparency, both in terms of the quantity and the 
quality of the data collected, never mind the ways this data is put to use.
The violation of the original ideals of the Internet appears to have no limits. Even access 
providers have joined the game of increasingly meddling with exchanges by selectively 
altering the bandwidth allocated to the most popular services, compressing images 
without notifying customers, or by not deducting connection charges when customers 
access their services through their own flat rate mobile phone. Such practices openly 
contravene the principle of ‘net neutrality’, a concept that emerged in 2003, when some 
access providers were exploiting their strategic advantage to increase profits at the ex-
pense of their clients. These practices introduced an aspect of discrimination to the 
flow of Internet traffic, depending on location or the basis of content. Doing this openly 
impinges on one of the Internet’s most fundamental values, not only infringing on the 
freedom of expression but also on the freedom to do business. These types of practices 
also create a different Internet experience according to which service we use.
Finally, because the Internet has extended into a large number of contemporary social 
practices, its efficiency turns into an additional vulnerability as security flaws become 
ever more numerous and critical. Today, no governments, corporations or individuals 
no matter how powerful they may be, could claim that they are fully in control inside this 
new environment. No institution of users is free from the threat of surveillance or the 
destruction of a cyber attack. These new vulnerabilities condemn society to a new kind 
of transparency and new risks that threaten everyone from the most inconsequential 
individual to the most mediatized celebrity. Is it not time to ask what the Internet does 
to us and what we do for the Internet?
After twenty years of public use of the Internet, the conflicts of interest have become too 
serious and too constraining to continue on in this vein. We are truly seeing the end of 
a project whose initial aim was to be a global space of free interaction for humanity as 
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a whole. We now see the Internet’s neutrality compromised by a range of actors with 
conflicting interests. Originally intended to make space simply vanish, the Internet has 
on the contrary contributed to making the richness, the power and the multiplicity of 
the world’s spaces more tangible. By embracing an ever-larger number of people, the 
Internet has intensified what humanity has in common but at the same time it has deep-
ened the divide between societies based on essentially different values.
The Internet’s dynamics involve exactly this movement of the individual towards the 
world, where division should be interpreted in the light of basic cohesion and unique-
ness. The Internet offers humanity an opportunity to lift itself up into a unified society. 
In that sense the Internet can be considered as an opportunity to manage coexistence 
on a global scale and to truly recognize the legitimacy of individuals as the primary con-
stituents of politics. By opening itself to all individuals at the same time, the Internet 
heightens the fragility of nation-states and supports the emergence of the world as one 
unified and single political horizon for humanity.
Terrorism, the environment and joblessness are among the problems developing at 
the global scale which typify the challenges nation-states face in justifying their endur-
ing sovereignty and their claim to provide solutions to problems which are clearly too 
large to solve at the national level. For too long, we have underestimated the Internet’s 
capacity to change societies and the capacity of societies to change the Internet. By 
altering the nature of space, repositioning the relative place of things and modifying 
the practical modalities of social interaction, the Internet has shaken up values, which 
may often work as laws. The transformation has been so radical that all previous no-
tions about what is fair and appropriate are practically invalidated and subject to new 
negotiations.
The extension of free individual expression to the world as a whole, the free sharing of 
cultural goods and generalized surveillance all perfectly demonstrate the radicalism of 
the changes brought about by the Internet. We are gradually becoming aware that the 
asymmetry between today’s digital practices and our current regulative apparatus is un-
sustainable. The extension of Internet usage to other major parts of the world is a great 
political challenge. At this stage, the many values that play a role in regulating societ-
ies are actuated: conflicts between individuals, states and businesses demonstrate that 
while freedom of expression, privacy and property may be fundamental principles, they 
are open to very different interpretations. The problems arising from the changes pro-
duced by the Internet revitalizes the contradictions between these values. It should be 
self-evident that security and privacy, intellectual property rights and gratis, freedom of 
expression and defamation laws are in opposition to each other. Generally speaking net 
neutrality is not a sufficient policy. Today it should be more apparent that the enduring 
existence of social values is not arbitrary and that they are often relevant and essential. 
Sometimes the Internet allows us to forget the long and perilous development of the 
laws that govern our society and the original reasons for establishing these rules.
The Internet has profoundly transformed the nature of our actions to such an extent 
that it compels us to develop new effective responses that undoubtedly will expose us to 
new vulnerabilities but also to new opportunities to commence an in-depth renewal of 
coexistence. This debate should not be restricted to experts but is a challenge involving 
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all of society and it should mobilize political organizations in their most essential func-
tion: the task of critically thinking about the conditions of our existence.
The Internet’s ultimate ends express specific values that do include many of the issues 
faced by society today. Most societies depend upon politics to revolve conflicts of inter-
ests and to achieve coexistence. Politics involves taking a stand when there is imbal-
anced representation of different points of view. What is new with the advent of the In-
ternet is certainly not the clash of values between distinct individuals but the complexity 
in reaching a balanced representation of opinions on a global scale. This is occurring at 
the same time as nation-states are becoming less able to achieve a non-partisan perspec-
tive themselves.
Net neutrality and self-organization are an aspect of the libertarian principles expressed 
by a substantial constituency that emerged alongside the development of the Inter-
net. These libertarian notions however are in direct contradiction with the politics of 
coexistence which is founded on the basis of social contracts. Net neutrality and self-
organization are not in themselves sufficient to effectively prevent all forms of preda-
tory practices like pedophilia, terrorism and totalitarianism. Nor do these libertarian 
principles safeguard privacy, as confidential information can easily be revealed for the 
sake of ‘transparency’ or commercial gain. Finally, net neutrality and self-organization 
are not alone sufficient to manage the various proprietary systems; even the Creative 
Commons license presupposes some degree of enforced compliance.
Societies are organized with the assumption that not all activities are legitimate and 
that in order to restrain those activities that are illegitimate some form of regulation is 
necessary. Until now the Internet has been able to support a remarkably varied range 
of practices. However, like any other space, the Internet leaves open opportunities for 
violence, extortion, theft, bias, manipulation, defamation, hostility and other contempt-
ible activities. To act as if these activities did not occur, or to take a neutral stance to-
wards them by appealing to freedom is a morally indefensible position. When conflicts 
of interest arise between individuals it is always advisable to consider which party profits 
from such a conflict and which party is subjected to supposed neutrality.
It is also misguided not to recognize the potential for liberation and innovation on the 
Internet. Society must take this opportunity to openly debate what is truly essential. We 
must accept that the world has changed, that we have changed and therefore reconsider-
ing the rules of our coexistence is not a bad proposition. We are now facing a challenge 
of uncommon complexity. We have reached a point that demands us to be uncompro-
mising when addressing the abuses every political society is prone to committing and 
the manipulation of the Internet.
What the world really needs is a major political debate centering on the future of the only 
place that the whole of humanity shares in common. There is no doubt that a choice will 
have to be made, between a globalization of politics or the end of the Internet as we 
know it. We will have to make the Internet the central issue of a debate which given the 
environmental crisis, the threat of global terrorism and the state of the world economy, 
obliges us to realize that what unites us is more important than what divides us. In the 
absence of such a radical shift in politics, we will not only witness a much more dras-
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tic partitioning of the Internet but even more worrying, a further fragmentation of our 
world. We will risk the collapse of globalization and nationalist insurgencies everywhere, 
which will render nation-states more powerless and vulnerable.
The Internet is in clear danger of disappearing and part of our very humanity threatens 
to disappear with it. As the bearer of a form of globalization actively empowering indi-
viduals, the very existence of the Internet suggests that the time has come for humanity 
to consider a change in scale towards its final destiny: the World. The Internet is the 
perfect public place to rise to this challenge; it is an ideal but also fragile space that we 
must never cease to cherish, share and protect together.
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